

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0239

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 22, 1975
(SALT TWO - 683)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 22, 1975.

QUOTE:

SEmenov Statement, July 22, 1975

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS OF NOT BUILDING UP STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, RECORDED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

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I

AS SPECIFIED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS OF RECENT YEARS, THE AGREED GOAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IS ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS AIMED AT WORKING OUT AND ADOPTING MEASURES TOWARD CURBING AND HALTING THE ARMS RACE.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS ARE ALSO PART OF THESE EFFORTS. IN THE JOINT SOVIET-US STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 24, 1974 THE SIDES TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF THE VALUE OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 WHICH WERE CONCLUDED AS A RESULT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS ARE A MOST IMPORTANT STEP WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR AND CURBING THE ARMS RACE AND CREATES PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD GENERAL DISARMAMENT.

NATURALLY THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC ARMS, REGARDING CONCLUSION OF WHICH AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN VLADIVOSTOK, MUST ALSO BECOME A NEW AND EFFECTIVE MEASURE IN CURBING AND HALTING THE ARMS RACE. ON THIS SCORE THERE IS EVIDENTLY NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION.

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS THE SIDES WILL ASSUME UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST BE SUCH AS NOT TO PERMIT A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THUS PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDERMINING, DURING ITS TERM, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED.

THE NECESSITY OF THIS FOLLOWS ALSO FROM THE CONTENT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH NOT ONLY PROVIDES FOR MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BUT ALSO CONTAINS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES REGARDING FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS ON POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

THUS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN CONCLUDING THE NEW AGREEMENT, PREVENTION OF A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS THE SECRET

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COMMON OBJECTIVE OF BOTH SIDES.

II

WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF OBLIGATIONS THE SIDES WILL ASSUME UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT THE PROVISIONS BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN TERMS OF PREVENTING A BUILDUP

IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND CONSEQUENTLY ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE DOCUMENT BEING PREPARED.

IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK OF PREPARING THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET SIDE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE DELEGATIONS CONCRETE AND THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE. THEY ARE REFLECTED, IN PARTICULAR, IN ARTICLE X OF THE JOINT DOCUMENTS OF MAY 7, 1975.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONS BEFORE THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE CARRIED OUT DURING THE WORKING RECESS, CONFIRMED THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AFTER ALL, THIS CONCERN BANNING THOSE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH, THOUGH NOT CURRENTLY IN THE ARSENALS OF THE SIDES, MIGHT VERY WELL BE DEPLOYED DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND THUS BECOME A NEW SPHERE FOR COMPETITION IN THE BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC ARMS WITH ALL THE DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM FOR THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AS A WHOLE AND THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IN PARTICULAR. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN PREPARING THE NEW AGREEMENT THE SIDES CANNOT BUT BE INTERESTED IN BARRING SUCH A DEVELOPMENT AND IN RELIABLY BLOCKING ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS FOR CIRCUMVENTING AND UNDERMINING THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

LET US TURN TO THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF ARTICLE X OF THE JOINT DOCUMENTS OF MAY 7, 1985.

SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES OF SECRET

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INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE. ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WOULD PECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM MIGHT APPEAR IN THE FUTURE. SHOULD SUCH MISSILES BE DEVELOPED, THEIR CAPABILITIES WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF LAND-BASED ICBMS WHOSE LAUNCHERS ARE BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. HAVING AN INTERCONTINENTAL FLIGHT RANGE AND THE CAPABILITY OF DELIVERING A HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON, SUCH CRUISE MISSILES COULD BE USED TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE QUESTION OF BANNING CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE HAS BEEN TOUCHED UPON IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT PROPOSALS OF THE U.S.

DELEGATION IN 1970 AND 1973, IT CAN BE STATED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE SIDES AGREE ON THE NEED FOR A POSITIVE SOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE TO TIE DOWN THIS AGREEMENT IN APPROPRIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WORDING TO BE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE INTERESTS OF ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO BE SERVED BY INCLUDING IN IT A PROVISION--ARTICLE X, SUBPAR. (B)--ON BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS. DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS WOULD MEAN THAT A NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM HAS APPEARED, NO LESS DANGEROUS THAN BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH WHEN DEPLOYED ON VARIOUS WATER-BORNE VEHICLES IN THE WIDE REACHES OF SEAS AND OCEANS WOULD BE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE SIDES. BANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH SUCH A RANGE WOULD BLOCK THE WAY FOR A POTENTIALLY POSSIBLE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT; THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE IN ACCORD WITH THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF THE SIDES TO PREVENT AND CURB THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

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TO ACHIEVE THE SAME OBJECTIVES, SUBPAR. (C) HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN ARTICLE X OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975, PROVIDING FOR AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS ON WATER-BORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES. ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES WOULD PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS WOULD APPEAR WHICH COULD BE DEPLOYED ON ANY SHIPS OR WATER-BORNE VEHICLES. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT A DIFFERENT COURSE OF EVENTS WOULD NOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE.

ARTICLE X, SUBPAR. (D), OF THE JOINT WORKING DOCUMENT CONTAINS AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF FIXED OR MOBILE INSTALLATIONS FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, IN ANY PLACE WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INTERNAL AND INLAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM.

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THE ADVISABILITY OF THE SIDES ASSUMING SUCH AN OBLIGATION FOLLOWS FROM THE TASK OF PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP OR DEPLOY THE AFOREMENTIONED LAUNCHERS--FIXED AND MOBILE--WOULD REINFORCE THE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF THE LIMITATION MEASURES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT OR DEPLOYMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON THE SEABED AND OCEAN FLOOR WOULD CONSTITUTE A STEP TOWARD EXCLUDING THE SEABED AND OCEAN FLOOR AND THE SUBSOIL THEREOF FROM THE SPHERE OF THE ARMS RACE. ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, OF WHICH THE USSR AND US ARE DEPOSITARIES. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE OBLIGATION PROPOSED IN ARTICLE X, SUBPAR. (D), REINFORCES THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT TREATY, INASMUCH AS ITS SPHERE OF APPLICATION WOULD ALSO COVER THE TERRITORIAL SEA AS WELL AS INTERNAL AND INLAND WATERS. ON THE BASIS ON THE COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE SIDES WHICH HAS BECOME APPARENT IN THE COURSE OF EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF ARTICLE X, SUBPAR. (D), THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A GOOD BASIS HERE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THEM AND FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

ARTICLE X, SUBPAR. (E), PROVIDES THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT THE SIDES WOULD ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KIND OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD OPERATE IN THE DIRECTION OUTLINED BY THE TREATY OF PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENSURING ITS STABILITY. BY BANNING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT SYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO EARTH ORBIT, THE SIDES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE EYES OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. PROCEEDING FROM THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE SYSTEMS SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE X, SUBPAR. (E), OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT SHOULD BE INCLUDED ALONG WITH OTHER NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE BANNED UNDER THE NEW

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AGREEMENT.

OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE IS THE OBLIGATION CONTAINED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (F) OF THAT ARTICLE. IT DEALS WITH BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

BEARING IN MIND THE POINT OF VIEW ON THIS QUESTION EXPRESSED BY THE US DELEGATION, I WOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM THIS POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE ONCE AGAIN. WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE PROHIBITED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. INDEED, THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT EACH SIDE WILL BE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 1,320 ICBMs AND SLBMs EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs. FROM THIS PROVISION IT FOLLOWS QUITE DEFINITELY THAT NO OTHER STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, EXCEPT THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, MAY BE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs UNDER THE TERMS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. NOTHING IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE GIVES GROUNDS FOR RETAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF EQUIPPING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES. LEAVING OPEN SUCH A POSSIBILITY WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE CONTENT OF THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND COULD LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF COMPETITION IN THIS NEW AREA. THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TASK OF LIMITATION AND POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

III

THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ENSUE FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE

DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US, TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, TO INCLUDE THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS AS WELL. IT IS ALSO FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS THE SIDES HAVE SET THEMSELVES WHEN IN THE SUMMER OF 1973 THEY TOOK THE STEP OF CONCLUDING THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE
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FACT THAT THE PROPOSAL TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH PROVIDES FOR OBLIGATIONS APPLYING TO BOTH SIDES EQUALLY, IS WHOLLY BASED ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, BY WHICH THE SIDES ARE TO BE GUIDED IN CONCLUDING THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE X WOULD CREATE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES EQUALLY, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE X OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975, WE ARE CONVINCED, PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR REACHING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WORKING OUT JOINT AGREED SOLUTIONS.

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